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This section contains a digest of all those decisions interpreting provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from August 16, 1962,
through December 1, 1962, in the National Reporter System, Pennsylvania
District and County Reports, 2d series, and Pennsylvania county reports.
Case citations preceded by a dagger (f) indicate decisions which are based
upon language contained in the 1953 version of the Code. Case citations pre-
ceded by an asterisk (*) indicate decisions construing or interpreting provi-




SECTION 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of
goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in con-
firmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements
of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for
their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity
of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).
Arciiri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24 (1962).
Arcuri's accountant made a $500 check payable to Weiss with the
following notation: "Tentative deposit on tentative purchase of 1415
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City Line Ave., Phila. Restaurant, Fixtures, Equipment, Goodwill." Two
weeks later both parties' representatives drew up a contract for the sale
of the restaurant. When Weiss telephoned Arcuri to inquire as to what
Arcuri intended to do, Arcuri informed him that he was no longer in-
terested in the restaurant and requested Weiss to return the $500. When
Weiss refused, Arcuri brought this action for the return of the $500.
The court felt Section 2-201 is one of the Uniform Commercial
Code's many safeguards against sharp commercial practices. "While the
section does not require a writing which embodies all the essential terms
of a contract and even goes so far as to permit omission of the price, it
does require some writing which indicates THAT A CONTRACT FOR
SALE HAS BEEN MADE." 'Emphasis court's.]
The court held that Section 2-201 (statute of frauds) renders
Weiss' defense of the formation of an enforceable contract insufficient as
a matter of law. The use of the word "tentative" in the notation on the
check is taken in its common meaning. This indefinite writing does not
satisfy the requirement of the statute.
John H. Wickersham E & C Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co., 58 Lane. Law
Rev. 164 (Pa. 1962).
On April 15, Moody, acting as agent for Arbutus, submitted a
proposal to Wickersham containing an offer to furnish a certain quantity
of steel for $22,000, later reduced to $21,800. The proposal contained
the following statement:
Should you desire to enter into a contract with us on the basis set
forth, please so indicate by signing and returning to us, within 10
days from the date hereof .. . which shall become a contract
upon, but not before, acceptance by Arbutus.
On April 22, Wickersham sent to Moody the following memo-
randum:
Tt is our intention to award you a contract for furnishing all short
span steel joints, bridging, anchors, ceiling extensions .. . for the
sum of $21,800. . .
This award will be contingent upon our receiving a contract from
the Owners for the General Construction and upon your furnishing
us reasonable assurance of your ability to furnish the material when
required.
It is also understood that you will prepare Shop Drawings . • .
prior to the receipt of a formal order, this work to be performed at
your own risk.
Arbutus did not respond to this memorandum within ten days. On May
14, Wickersham received notice that it had been awarded the contract.
Arbutus communicated withdrawal of its "May 1 proposal" on June 30.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover the difference between the contract
price and the price it was forced to pay on the open market. Arbutus
demurred on the grounds that there had been no writing sufficient to
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satisfy Section 2-201(1). Although not denying this, the plaintiff main-
tained that the memorandum of April 22 sent to the defendants and
not objected to by them was sufficient to bring the contract within
Section 2-201(2).
The court noted that this provision of the Code established four
basic requirements which must be satisfied in order to impose liability on
one who has not signed the contract. These are: (1) there be a writing
in confirmation of the oral contract, (2) the writing bind the sender,
(3) the writing be received and (4) no reply has been made.
(1) The court found that the memorandum did not refer to any
prior dealing and was not a confirmation of an oral contract.
(2) The court found words only of future intent rather than any
present offer. The order was made contingent on the general award. The
court supported this view by noting the requirement that work on the
shop drawings be done at the risk of the defendant. Finally, the memo-
randum did not indicate the quantity that the plaintiff had agreed to
take. This was contingent on the plans of the architect. Hence, it was
not sufficient to bind plaintiff sender.
(3) The cause of action failed to state that the April 22 memo-
randum had been received. (Under the standards established by the
court this fact was necessary in order to show not only that the writing
had been received but that the defendant had the opportunity to reply.)
The court granted that an amendment could correct this objection, but
the complaint could not be amended to overcome the objections made
to the interpretation of the memorandum itself. Because the writing did
not satisfy the four requirements of Section 2-201(2) the court sustained
the demurrer.
Kessler v. Green Co., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 186 (1962).
See the Annotation to Section 8-319, infra.
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serv-
ing for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or else-
where is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even•
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
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(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from courses of dealing or usage of trade.
t Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403, 184 A.2d 250 (1962).
Employer purchased two portable heaters from seller in 1956. The
heaters were in daily use without incident for four months. When em-
ployee attempted to light the heater in the usual manner, it exploded
and severely injured him. Employee brought an action against seller
contending that the heater was not safe for industrial use and that seller
had impliedly warranted it to be safe. In his charge to the jury, the trial
court explained the meaning of "warranty" and "implied warranty"
by direct reference to Section 2-314. He also explained that seller was a
merchant under Section 2-104(1). Jury returned a verdict for seller.
The trial judge granted employee's motion for a new trial because he
felt his charge to the jury was not specific enough.
This court reversed the granting of the motion for a new trial. It
held that Section 2-314 is clear as to implied warranties and that the
trial judge's explanation of this section was not confusing to the jury
but was a proper instruction. The court did not decide seller's conten-
tion that there was no privity between employee and seller as it was not
necessary to do so.
[Annotator's Comment: This case points out the fact that a charge
to the jury as to the definition of merchantability is acceptable when
lifted directly from Section 2-314. This being so, attorneys would be
wise to direct their evidence to the existence or nonexistence of the ele-
ments in the definition in Section 2-314.]
SECTION 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods;
"Entrusting."
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable
title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the pur-
chaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser,
or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dis-
honored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be 'a. "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as lar-
cenous under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
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goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procure-
ment of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been
such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Trans-
fers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
* Hudiberg Chevrolet Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W.2d 252
(1962).
James obtained delivery of an automobile from an Oklahoma dealer
under a conditional sales contract after giving a check as down payment.
He was not to remove the automobile from the state without permission.
The contract was recorded. Subsequently the check was dishonored and
the dealer attempted to regain possession. James had taken the auto-
mobile to Georgia where he had obtained a certificate of title under an
assumed name. Then he took it to Wisconsin where he obtained another
certificate. He sold the car to a Milwaukee dealer who, having purchased
it in good faith and for value, sold it to the defendant, a customer.
The lower court dismissed the action brought by the secured party
against the customer who purchased from the Milwaukee dealer. In af-
firming, the court noted with approval Section 2-403(1), and used it and
prior case law to support the finding that James had a voidable title as
a result of the bad check, rather than a void title as the Oklahoma dealer
had urged. The voidable title became indefeasible upon the bona fide
sale to the Milwaukee dealer. Thus the defendant was protected.
Although the dealer had attempted to rescind, his actions were not
so effective as to preclude James from passing title to a good faith pur-
chaser. He would have had to repossess or in some other way make it
impossible for the purchaser to buy in good faith.
Under applicable Wisconsin law the secured party was required
to file within ten days after he had notice that the automobile had been
brought into the state. Because he had failed to make such a filing, he
could not enforce his reservation of title against the local dealer or
his transferee.
[Annotator's Comment: Although the Code has not been adopted
in Wisconsin, a legislative committee has recommended such adoption.
Had the Code been in effect, the secured party would, by reason of
Section 9-103(3), have been given four months in which to perfect
his interest in Wisconsin while allowing his out of state perfection to
remain effective during that period. Therefore, the decision in this case
might well have been different.
Assuming that the secured party's interest had been perfected or
that the transaction in this case occurred during that four month per-
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fection period, the defendant might have urged two possible defenses to
the dealer's claim. The buyer in the ordinary course might have stressed
Section 9-307 (1), but this offers him little protection for by its terms
such a buyer takes free of any interest created by his seller. However,
Section 2-403(2) allows a merchant in possession of goods to transfer
all rights of his entruster. The section speaks in terms of "any entrust-
ing"—therefore, if the "entruster" is viewed as the secured party rather
than the party subject to the security interest, the section allows the
merchant who handles the goods, the Milwaukee dealer, to transfer
all the rights of his entruster, the secured party. This construction of
Section 2-403(2) would afford the buyer a defense. Absent this
construction, the dealer-merchant could transfer only what his im-
mediate transferor had—the rights of a conditional buyer subject to
the seller's security interest.
The court in the instant case, however, seems to be referring to
subsection (1) of Section 2-403. That subsection refers to a person
with a voidable title and does not apply to the interest of a debtor
subject to a perfected security interest. That interest does not include
a power to transfer to a good faith purchaser, as would the interest
of a buyer who had made conditional payment by check which was
later dishonored. The Milwaukee dealer in this case is a good faith
transferee who would be subject to a perfected security interest under
Section 9-301; so, it would seem, would be his transferee, the de-
fendant.]
SECTION 2-502. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not
been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods in
which he has a special property under the provisions of the immediately
preceding section may on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid
portion of their price recover them from the seller if the seller becomes
insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment on their price.
(2) If the identification creating his special property has been made by
the buyer he acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform
to the contract for sale.
In the Matter of Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-507, infra.
SECTION 2-507. Effect of Seller's Tender; Delivery on Condition.
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept
the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. Tender
entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to
the contract.
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer
of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or
dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due.
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In the Matter of Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Debtor called a meeting of its creditors in July 1961 for the pur-
pose of effectuating a settlement. No settlement was consummated.
Debtor continued doing business but on a strict C.O.D. basis. Two
days prior to the filing of bankruptcy, seller delivered goods to debtor
and received debtor's check for their value which seller deposited but
was not paid because of the filing of the bankruptcy petition., There
was sufficient money in debtor's account to have paid the check. Seller
petitioned for reclamation of the goods within ten days.
The court held that seller could reclaim the goods since the sale
was not on credit and Section 2-507 allows seller to reclaim the goods
of a C.O.D., save when payment is not made upon demand of seller
when due. Debtor's check was not post-dated and since there were
sufficient funds to pay the check in the bank, debtor outwardly ap-
peared solvent. A businessman in financial difficulty is able to carry
on cash transactions and this transaction was of that category.
The court states that had the transaction been on credit, the trus-
tee would have the rights against the goods as any creditor would
have under state law. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
However, under "the Pennsylvania U.C.C." as the court interprets it,
if the seller has a right to reclaim the goods, he stands in a position
superior to any creditor.
[Annotator's Comment: This opinion distinguishes the contro-
versial prior holding, which gave a trustee in bankruptcy a superior
interest over the seller in goods sold on credit to a buyer who becomes
insolvent before payment is made, by pointing out that the goods in
this case were sold C.O.D. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
However, the reasoning this court used in reaching its decision drives
a wedge into the Kravitz case, which could lead to a desirable over-
ruling in line with the apparent intention of the Code.
In three different sections, the Code makes provision for obtaining
possession of goods sold under or identified to a contract for sale.
Section 2-502 provides that the buyer who pays for goods but does not
receive them before seller's insolvency, has a right to obtain them with no
given exception. The Official Comment indicates that, for the ten days
allowed by the statute, this right is superior to that of a lien creditor;
thereafter, the buyer's interest becomes a non-possessory security inter-
est requiring compliance with Article 9 for protection. Section 2-702
gives a correlative right to the seller upon the buyer's insolvency. That
section then provides that "the seller's right to reclaim . . is subject
to the rights of a . . . lien creditor under this Article." Nowhere in
Article 2 or in Article 9 is a lien creditor given rights superior to those
of the seller. The Kravitz case went outside the Code to hold that such
a creditor had prior rights. Section 2-507(2) is construed by the Mort
decision as giving the seller to a subsequent bankrupt the absolute
right of reclamation when the buyer's check in a non-credit sale is not
paid. Their is no statutory time limitation on this right. Yet the Ian-
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guage of Section 2-507(2) is far less certain than that of either 2-502
or 2-702: ". . [the buyer's] right as against the seller to retain or
dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due."
(Emphasis supplied.) The seller's right to get the goods back could
more easily be held to be a right good only against the buyer, but not
his creditors, than the right given in Section 2-702 which was so lim-
ited by the Kravitz case.
The court in the Mort case puts the intended meaning back into
the Code by interpreting "the Pennsylvania U.C.C." (Not Section
2-507 by itself.) The decision in the Kravitz case did not give the
UCC this meaning and even though the court in the Mort case dis-
tinguished Kravitz, it would have no choice but to re-examine or alter
its reasoning in Mort when confronted with the Kravitz facts.]
SECTION 2-511. Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by Check.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition to the
seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery.
(2) Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or in
any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless the seller
demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably
necessary to procure it.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act on the effect of an instrument
on an obligation (Section 3-802), payment by check is conditional and
is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due pre-
sentment.
Commonwealth v. Kelinson, 199 Pa. Super. 135, 184 A.2d 374 (1962).
Defendant was majority stockholder of a corporation engaged in
the wholesale meat business. In 1960 a delivery of meat was made to
corporation by transfer company. Defendant gave the driver a post-
dated check for the shipment as was the accustomed method. The
check was returned for want of sufficient funds and has never been
paid. Defendant was indicted and convicted under the "Worthless
Check Act" which provides that anyone who intentionally passes a
worthless check is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The court reversed the conviction holding that the fraud necessary
for conviction under the "Worthless Check Act" cannot be predicated
upon non-performance of a future promise and under case law a post-
dated check is a mere promise to discharge a present obligation at a
future date. The court also adopted Comment 6 to Section 2-511 and
held acceptance of a postdated check amounts to a delivery on credit;
the acceptor has a remedy against the maker for breach of contract.
It was easily shown that the driver had authority to make this con-
tract for his principal.
SECTION 2-702. Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's In-
solvency.
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse
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delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore de-
livered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section
2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on
credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within
ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been
made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery
the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection
the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the
rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien
creditor under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods
excludes all other remedies with respect to them.
In the Matter of Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (F.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-507, supra.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-419. Conversion of Instrument; Innocent Representative.
(1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses to
return it on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on
demand either to pay or to return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
(2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure
of the drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any other
action under subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed to be the
face amount of the instrument.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorse-
ments a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has
in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards
applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or
its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable
in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any
proceeds remaining in his hands.
Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Green-
field,— Mass.—, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
See case note, infra, for a summary and full discussion of this case.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-40 6. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unau-
thorized Signature or Alteration.
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or
the bank a customer who does not within one year from the time the state-
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